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1. INTRODUCTION 
The welfare effect of advertising has long been a subject of debate among 
economists. The debate stems from diverse beliefs regarding the function of advertising in 
society. If-Stigler (1961) suggests that advertising may benefit society by providing 
information to consumers.  Alternatively, Kaldor (1949-50) states that advertising is 
primarily deceptive in nature and hence reduces welfare by persuading consumers to 
purchase goods that do not maximize their pre-advertising utility.  Nelson (1974) agrees 
that advertising may provide little direct information to consumers, but rather provides 
indirect information to consumers by signaling the quality of the advertised goods. Dixit 
and Norman (1978) argue that advertising shifts tastes and show that advertising is 
excessive under a variety of assumptions, even when post-advertising tastes are used as 
the standard for welfare analysis.  Fisher and McGowan (1979) propose that advertising 
creates desirable brand images that increase social welfare through the joint consumption 
of image-enhancing characteristics along with the goods themselves.  Shapiro (1980) 
suggests Dixit and Norman ignored the distributive gains from advertising in their welfare 
measure. 
Though debate about advertising among economists is long-lived, they have until 
recently been unable to use standard welfare analysis to show that advertising is excessive. 
The model proposed by Becker and Murphy (1993) assimilates the theory of advertising 2 
into the theory of complements and in doing so brings clarity and quantitative welfare 
analysis to the advertising debate. "A major analytical advantage of the [Becker-Murphy] 
approach that treats advertising as part of given preferences rather than shifting tastes is 
that the standard welfare analysis becomes directly  applicable."'  The Becker-Murphy 
model is used in this study to perform a standard welfare analysis of cigarette advertising. 
The main insight of the Becker-Murphy model is that it accounts for the benefits of 
advertising to consumers. Specifically, Becker and Murphy argue that television and radio 
programming compensates consumers for television and radio advertisements that lower 
consumer utility.  In this paper I will discuss the added possibility that compensation 
occurs in the form of discount coupons and advertising that  subsidizes magazines, 
newspapers and public transit.  Presumably, goods that contain advertisements are 
partially funded by revenues from advertisers. A glance at the morning newspaper or 
almost any magazine reveals a large proportion of space devoted to advertising. Without 
the funds paid to the paper or magazine for these advertisements, the profit-maximizing 
publishers would either raise the price of the publication or cease production.  Hence 
consumers are compensated for advertising with utility-raising publications. Advertising is 
also apparent in mass transit.  Buses, subways and taxicabs display a large number of 
advertisements which presumably lower the price of transit for consumers. Promotions at 
the point-of-sale and specialty item distribution through the mail or at promotional events 
provide consumers with free samples and price discounts.  These benefits should be 
accounted for when analyzing the social impact of advertising. 
Becker and Murphy (1993, p.956) 3 
Another appealing attribute of the Becker-Murphy model is that it provides an 
empirical test of whether a change in the market level of advertising is beneficial or 
harmful to society. As previous research has indicated, the impact of a change in the level 
of advertising on equilibrium market price will be crucial in determining the total impact 
on social welfare.2 
The advertising-price relationship is estimated using a modification of the new 
empirical industrial organization (NEIO) technique for estimating a firm's reduced- form 
price equation, or supply relation, in an imperfectly competitive industry.  A supply 
relation is estimable and will include advertising. 
The cigarette industry provides an interesting application of the Becker-Murphy 
framework and NEIO method. Advertising regulation is prominent in the recent history of 
this imperfectly competitive industry, and further regulation has been proposed.  The 
Broadcast Advertising Ban (1971) made it illegal to advertise cigarettes on television and 
radio. President Clinton suggested in the State of the Union speech on February 4, 1997 
that cigarette advertisements that reach children be banned. Specific policies proposed by 
the Clinton administration include banning the advertisement of cigarettes on billboards 
near schools and in media that reach children. 
2 Becker and Murphy (1993) show that when advertisements are given away with the quantity of 
advertisements controlled by producers, a firm that maximizes net profits must satisfy p,(1-1/ed ) = cx and 
(4' 1d4)  (&/.041)(p, - c7) = ca for good (x), advertising (A), cost of x = (cx), cost of advertising = (ca), 
price of x = px, and elasticity of demand for x is Ed. Similarly, when firms allow consumers to buy all the 
advertising they want at pa, the first-order condition becomes p,(1-1/ed )  (43.  ac)A = cx.  Hence 
advertising tends to raise or lower equilibrium price as it lowers or raises the elasticity of demand for the 
advertised good. They proceed to show that "the amount of advertising is insufficient if the equilibrium 
price of the advertised product falls." (p. 958) The assumption that advertising generally raises price is a 
hallmark of the Dixit and Norman (1978) theory of advertising.  Tremblay and Tremblay (1995b) find 
empirical support that beer advertising tends to raise price. 4 
Cigarette smoking is the primary cause of preventable death according to the 1996 
Surgeon General's Report. Consumer Reports (December, 1996) states that 419,000 
deaths per year are directly attributable to tobacco use.  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
ruled in Central Hudson Gas Corporation v. Public Service Commission (447 U.S. 557, 
1980) that commercial speech can be restricted if restriction provides a substantial social 
gain and if the restriction is not more extensive than needed to fulfill its goal. The goal of 
this study is to determine if greater restrictions on cigarette advertising would augment 
social welfare. 5 
2. ADVERTISING AND WELFARE
 
The debate on advertising and welfare is long and diverse.  Kaldor (1949-50) 
discusses the positive and normative economic advertising issues, with the belief that 
advertising is primarily deceptive in nature.  Stigler (1961) provides a discussion of the 
various forms of direct and useful information that advertising may provide to consumers. 
Dixit and Norman (1978) develop a model of advertising that shifts tastes and utility, 
which shows that advertising is always excessive in imperfectly competitive markets. 
Fisher and McGowan (1979) and Shapiro (1980) comment on Dixit and Norman and 
provide a discussion of the importance of including the benefits from advertising in a 
logical manner.  Becker and Murphy (1993) consider advertising as part of the stable 
preference structure of consumers, clarifying the many positive and normative implications 
of advertising. 
Because this paper uses the Becker-Murphy framework, a more detailed discussion 
is provided. Becker and Murphy (1993) consider a monopoly setting in which advertising 
(A) affects social welfare (S), measured by the sum of consumer and producer surplus. 
Social welfare is assumed to be strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable in 
advertising. The social welfare function is defined as follows: 
S = V(A,p,T) + n(A,p,T),  (1) 6 
where V is the money value of consumer utility,3 it is the producer surplus from the 
production of advertising and output (Q), p is the price of output, and T is any revenue 
from the sale of advertising to consumers. 
Within this framework advertising can be viewed by the consumer as either a good 
(awaA > 0) sold at a positive price (T > 0) or a bad (araA < 0), which suggests that 
people will consume it only if adequately compensated, for example by partially funding 
magazines, newspapers, and other goods where advertisements are present.  When 
advertising is a bad, revenues flow from producers to consumers (T < 0) in the form of 
subsidized television and radio broadcasting and by partially funding magazines, 
newspapers, transit, and the price of the advertised good through discount coupons.  In 
this model advertising does not change tastes but is assumed to increase firm demand by 
acting as a complement to output. 
The welfare effect of advertising is determined by totally differentiating equation 
(1) with respect to A: 
dS/dA = araA + (aV/ap)(dp/dA) + (5V/80(dT/dA)+ dit/dA.  (2) 
Note that .31//ap = -Q by Roy's identity. Also araT = -1 as all revenues from the sale of 
advertising flow from consumers to firms, and revenues are assumed to flow only between 
consumers and firms. In addition, if the monopoly firm is a profit maximizer, dir/dA = 0. 
Thus, equation (2) simplifies to: 
dS/dA = av/aA - Q(dp /dA) - dT/dA.  (3) 
3 This analysis follows the Becker-Murphy framework, where advertisements and the goods advertised are 
treated as complements in stable metautility functions. 7 
Given that S is strictly concave in advertising, advertising is excessive if dS/dA < 0, is 
optimal if dS/dA = 0, and is undersupplied if dS/dA > 0. 
It should be noted that the social welfare function given in equation (1) is 
incomplete if there are externalities associated with smoking [Tremblay and Tremblay 
(1995b)].  Whether there are significant externalities associated with smoking is also a 
source of debate among economists.  Lee (1991) admits that "second-hand" smoke is 
irritating to nonsmokers, but argues that the external costs of smoking either do not exist 
or are internalized by private bargaining.  However, Allen (1992) suggests that Lee 
overlooked the problem of identifying smokers in insurance markets.  For example, 
smokers create a negative externality in life insurance markets, where one cannot identify 
smokers, and smokers have a higher probability of dying. Furthermore, many individuals 
(e.g. children) may not be involved in the bargaining process and will not be compensated 
through bargaining.  Coasian bargaining also requires well-defined property rights, an 
issue that is still being litigated.  Additionally, smoking may reduce labor productivity. 
Data in Smoking and Health: A Report of the U.S. Surgeon General's Office (1979) 
suggest that smokers are absent from work 73 percent more days per year than 
nonsmokers.  This will create a negative externality if production takes place in a team 
environment.  Furthermore, Manning et al. (1989) report that fires caused by smokers 
destroy more than $300 million worth of property each year. 
The sensitivity of demand with respect to advertising is also a source of contention 
among economists. Schmalensee (1972) did not find significant advertising elasticities for 
1953-1967. However Hamilton (1972) found  that  "advertising tended  to  boost 
consumption 95.0 cigarettes per year" per capita.  Seldon (1989) also finds that 8 
advertising increases demand. Tremblay and Tremblay (1995a, p. 123) found that a 1 
percent increase in advertising expenditures would "generate a 0.095 percent increase in 
per capita cigarette consumption or 3.67 cigarettes per person (aged 18 or older) per 
year."  Increased demand will lead to a higher associated externality.  Hence smoking 
externalities and cigarette advertising are related through demand. These facts suggest 
that the social welfare function should include potential negative externalities when 
analyzing the welfare effect of cigarette advertising. Allowing for externalities and more 
than one producer of cigarettes, the social welfare function becomes: 
S = V(A,p,T,E)+ n(A,p,T,E)  (4) 
where Tr is now the aggregate producer surplus from all firms in the economy and E is the 
dollar value of externalities associated with cigarette smoking. Note that av/aE < 0 and 
air,/8E < 0.4 The associated change in welfare due to a change in cigarette advertising is 
now: 
dS/dA = av/aA - dT/dA  Q(dp/dA) + (araE + an/aE)dE/dA + (I)  (5) 
where (1)  RaeaA) + (an/ap)(dp/dA) + (an/aT)(dT/dA)]. If competition is sufficient to 
ensure that long-run profit is zero or if producers act as a cartel then (1) = 0.5 Since there 
is no evidence of economic profit in cigarette production,6 equation (5) can be rewritten as 
the partial differential: 
4 Assuming an increase in the externality due to cigarette smoking does not increase profit. Studies show 
that smokers exhibit higher absentee rates, presumably negatively affecting the productivity of their co­
workers. 
5 Otherwise, (1) < 0 as in a non-cooperative setting it is optimal for each firm to advertise more than that 
which maximizes joint profit, hence the non-cooperative level of advertising will exceed the optimal (joint 
profit-maximizing) level of advertising. See Tremblay and Tremblay (1995b) Appendix B for a thorough 
proof. 
6 Tobacco manufacture seems to have normal returns compared to the rest of the manufacturing sector. 
Return on equity is ranked as the best measure of accounting profitability by CPA's according to Troy 9 
dS = VAdA - (dT/dA)dA - Q(dp/dA)dA + (VE + nE)(dE/dA)dA  (6) 
where VA= araA,VE= araE, and icE = ait/aE. 
Equation (6) provides an estimable equation for the change in social welfare due to 
a change in cigarette advertising.  General equilibrium effects are ignored in this study, 
which is appropriate if similar price and advertising changes occur in markets for pipe 
tobacco, chewing tobacco and cigars.  Sources which are discussed below will provide 
estimates of VA, dT/dA, and (VE + KE)(dE/dA). Section 4 will estimate (dp/dA). Because 
it will be shown that cigarette advertising is excessive, and economists do not agree on the 
value of the components of equation (6), the selected estimates of the components of 
equation (6) are biased against this conclusion. This will bias the estimate of dS upward, 
in favor of the conclusion that advertising is insufficient from society's point of view. 
The change in advertising (dA) is set equal to $24.4 million, one percent of the 
1994 level of domestic cigarette advertising expenditures in 1982 dollars.' The change in 
the money value of consumer utility with respect to a marginal increase in cigarette 
advertising, ceteris paribus is VA.  VA times the change in advertising (dA) is then the total 
change in the dollar value of consumer utility, VAdA.  Tremblay and Tremblay (1995a) 
estimate VAdA to be at most $18.3 million (1982 dollars) in the image-creating view of 
advertising.' 
(1995).  Return on equity in tobacco manufacture was 4.9% in 1995.  Meat products and alcoholic 
beverages other than malt beverages also had a 4.9% return on equity for the same period.  Dairy 
products, preserved fruits and vegetables, malt liquors, bottled soft drinks and women's and children's 
clothing manufacture exhibited 6.6%, 9.9%, 8.9%, 13.4% and 11.2% return on equity, respectively for the 
same period. Figures are from Troy (1995). 
Cigarette advertising expenditures are from the Federal Trade Commission (1994), deflated by the 
producer price index as published by the U.S. Department of Commerce (1995). 
This is the largest increase in consumer surplus reported by Tremblay and Tremblay (1995a) using 
similar data and a model similar to that described in section 3. 
8 10 
The change in the flow of revenue from the sale of advertising with respect to a 
change in advertising is dT/dA. Cigarette advertising in newspapers, magazines, coupons 
and transit accounted for 67 percent of domestic cigarette advertising expenditures in 
1994.9 The remainder of advertising expenditures went to fund outdoor (billboard), point­
of-sale, specialty distribution and direct mail advertising.  Though it may be difficult to 
argue that billboards and direct-mail advertising benefit consumers, I assume that all 
advertising expenditures subsidize the price of utility-raising goods. Hence dT/dA = -1 
and -(dT/dA)dA = $24.4 million. 
Though the external costs of smoking are likely large, they are considered to be 
nonexistent in this study. Therefore the estimate of the increase in the externality due to 
an increase in advertising (VE + nE)(dEdA)dA = $0. 
Given the above information, equation (6) reduces to (in millions of 1982 dollars): 
dS = $18.3 million + $24.4 million - 0(dp/dA)dA - $0 million.  (7) 
Equation (7) implies that cigarette advertising is socially excessive if the price effect due to 
a marginal increase in advertising expenditures, 0(dp/dA)dA, is greater than $42.7 million 
in 1982 dollars. This result supports the Becker-Murphy (1993) and Dixit-Norman (1978) 
findings that the social impact of a change in advertising hinges on the price effect and 
indicates that the answer to this question is an empirical answer. The remainder of this 
study will focus on the price effect of a marginal change in advertising. 
9 Federal Trade Commission (1996). 11 
3. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
 
The new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approach, as described by 
Bresnahan (1989), provides a method for estimating the determinants of a firm's 
equilibrium price in an imperfectly competitive setting.  For empirical estimation, the 
firm's first order condition for profit maximization is normally written as: 
p,= MC,+ X,q,,  (8) 
where p, is the price firm i charges, q, is the quantity produced by firm i and X. is the 
market power parameter 
X = -[ap/aq, + (apVI)(aaq,)].  (9) 
The first order condition (8) is referred to as the firm's supply relation, where a is 
aggregate industry output excluding q, and aWaq, is the conjectural variation.  The 
conjectural variation is a measure of the degree to which firm conduct is collusive.10 This 
supply relation is desirable for it allows one to test for both price-setting (X > 0) and price-
taking (X = 0) behavior. The industry supply relation is the aggregate of firm's individual 
profit maximization conditions. In this case X, measures average industry market power." 
To allow market power to vary with advertising, the supply relation should allow 
price to also be a function of advertising. Hence: 
P = MC + X.00 + XiA  (10) 
1() See Bresnahan (1989) and Schmalensee (1972) for more on this issue.
 
I I  This assumes Gorman polar form of costs: that firms have linear and parallel expansion paths, so that
 
MC are constant and equal across firms.  This is a common assumption that is usually implicit in
 
aggregate production or consumption studies. See Bresnahan (1989) for aggregative interpretation issues.
 12 
at the industry leve1.12  Advertising is interacted with two dummy variables to allow for 
different effects of advertising before and after the broadcast advertising ban. Adding a 
stochastic error term, the supply relation now becomes: 
P = MC + A.4)Q + XiA*D55  k2A*Dn+  (11) 
where D55 = 1 for 1955 to 1970 and = 0 thereafter, D7, = 0 for 1955 to 1970 and = 1 
thereafter, andµ is the stochastic error term. 
Following Tremblay and Tremblay (1995a), marginal cost (MC) is assumed to be 
constant and equal to average cost,13 and is defined as: 
MC = [PAY + MATL + (ASSETVAL* AAABOND) + A] / Q + TAX  (12) 
where PAY = total payroll for all employees (in millions of 1982 cents), MATL = total cost 
of materials (in millions of 1982 cents), ASSETVAL = gross value of fixed assets (in 
millions of 1982 cents), AAABOND = Moody's AAA corporate bond rate, A = advertising 
expenditures (in millions of 1982 cents), Q = quantity of cigarettes domestically consumed 
(in millions), and TAX = total state and federal tax per cigarette (in 1982 cents). 
Economic theory suggests that price and income should enter into the demand for 
cigarettes. I will also allow for variable advertising effects on demand before and after the 
Broadcast Advertising Ban.  A post-1972 time trend allows for the possibility that 
preferences for smoking changed after 1972 due to increased awareness of the hazards of 
smoking and decreased availability of smoking areas due to adoption of Clean Air 
policies." A dummy variable representing the Fairness Doctrine which required that one 
12 Let p = MC + X,C) where k =  + ki(A/Q). Then p = MC + X.0Q + ki(A/Q)Q = MC + koQ +
 
13 This assumption is consistent with Applebaum (1982).
 
14 A time trend specification is used as a proxy for the increasing state and municipal adoption of Clean
 
Indoor Air laws beginning in Arizona in 1972.  See Chaloupka and Saffer (1992) for more on Clean
 
Indoor Air laws.
 13 
anti-smoking advertisement be aired for every four pro-smoking advertisements is also 
included. The following market demand equation is proposed: 
(13) PCQ  130 +131P +132PCY+ OA *D55 -4- r-- -^ A *D7t ± 05* T1972 + (36DFA1R + 6 
where PCQ = per capita quantity (in thousands), P = retail price per cigarette (in cents), 
PCY = per capita disposable income (in 1982 dollars per person), A = advertising 
expenditures (in millions of 1982 dollars), T1972 = post-1972 time trend (= year - 1972 for 
1973-94, = 0 otherwise), DFAIR is the Fairness Doctrine dummy variable (= 1 for 1968-70, 
= 0 otherwise), and s is a stochastic error term.15 
Annual cigarette industry data from 1955 through 1994 are used to estimate the 
system of equations (11) and (13). The price effect of an increase in cigarette advertising 
expenditures, Q(dp/dA)dA, will be estimable after obtaining asymptotically unbiased and 
efficient parameter estimates of this system of equations. 
15  Alhough the theory of rational addiction has found widespread empirical support, [Becker et al. (1991), 
(1994), Chaloupka (1991), Olekalns and Bardsley (1996)1, it requires the inclusion of all past and future 
prices and advertising, and is therefore unidentified.  Akerloff (1991) poses a strong argument that the 
decision to pursue addictive activities represents time-inconsistent behavior, with rapid and large 
discounting of the future. Keeler et al. (1993) find little difference in elasticity of demand estimates for no 
addiction, myopic addiction and rational addiction to cigarettes. 14 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Means and standard deviations of variables are listed in Table 1.  The demand 
function and supply relation are estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS) and three-
stage least squares (3SLS) to correct for correlation of errors across equations. Analysis 
detects significant first-order autocorrelation in both the demand equation and supply 
relation.I6 Hence 2SLS and 3SLS estimates are corrected for first-order autocorrelation 
using generalized least squares. Regression results are reported in Table 2. 
The price coefficient estimates are negative and significant. 2SLS and 3SLS 
parameter estimates and mean values for price and per capita consumption provide 
inelastic 2SLS and 3SLS price elasticity of demand estimates of -0.53 and -0.65 
respectively.  This is in accordance with a wealth of prior research on cigarette price-
elasticity estimates as reported by Sung et al. (1994). Price elasticity of demand estimates 
evaluated at 1994 levels of price and quantity are elastic at -1.12 and -1.37 for 2SLS and 
3 SLS respectively. The difference in the estimates is most likely a consequence of the 
linear specification suggesting high elasticities at extreme values." Estimates for the post­
1972 time trend are negative and significant, suggesting that state and local laws regarding 
smoking have reduced per capita consumption of cigarettes. The W3 SLS parameter 
estimate for pre-1971 advertising is positive and significant at the 5 percent level of 
significance. The other demand parameter estimates for advertising are positive, but 
16  First-order autocorrelation is detected by regressing the two-stage least squares residuals on their 
lagged values.  The autoregressive parameter (p) is significant at the .10 level of confidence.  This 
estimate was used to correct for autocorrelation in the demand function and supply relation. 
17  The 1994 quantity is 467,000,000,000 cigarettes (lower than the mean value), and the 1994 price is 
5.33 cents per cigarette (higher than the mean value). 15 
Table 1
 
Variable Definitions, Means and Standard Deviations
 
for Cigarette Industry Data, 1955-1994
 
Variable 
Name 
PCQ 
P 
PCY 
MC 
Q 
A 
T1972 
DFAIR 
D55 
D71 
Definition 
Per capita quantity (in thousands) 
= Q/(Population 18 years and older) 
Retail price per cigarette including taxes 
(in cents; 1982 $) 
Per capita disposable income (1982 $) 
= Disposable income/total population 
Marginal cost proxy (in cents; 1982 $) 
= [payroll for all cigarette employees 
+ total cost of cigarette materials 
+ (gross value of fixed assets in cigarette industry 
x Moody's AAA corporate bond rate) 
+ Advertising expenditures] / Q 
+ Federal and weighted average state tax 
per cigarette (in cents; 1982 $) 
Quantity of cigarettes domestically consumed 
(in millions) 
Advertising expenditures 
(millions of 1982 $) 
Clean Indoor Air time trend 
= year-1972 for 1973-1994; = 0 otherwise 
Fairness Doctrine Act Dummy 
= 1 for 1968-1970; = 0 otherwise 
Pre-Broadcast Advertising Ban Dummy 
=1 for 1955-1970; = 0 otherwise 
Post-Broadcast Advertising Ban Dummy 
=1 for 1971-1994; = 0 otherwise 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
3.7426 
(0.5262) 
4.8135 
(0.6333) 
9550.82 
(2049.66) 
2.9897 
(0.4221) 
530333.08 
(67511.69) 
1180.69 
(759.138) 
5.775 
(7.1198) 
0.075 
(0.2667) 
0.400 
(0.4961) 
0.600 
(0.4961) 16 
Table 2
 
Cigarette Industry Demand Equation and Supply Relation
 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable Name  W2SLS Parameter  W3SLS Parameter 
Estimates  Estimates 
Demand Equation 
Constant  5.0483'  5.0173° 
(4.97)  (5.72) 
P  -0.4636'  -0.5664' 
(-4.31)  (-6.06) 
PCY  0.0001  0.0002 
(1.08)  (1.79) 
A *D55  0.0005  0.0008b 
(1.39)  (2.43) 
A *D71  0.0001  0.0002 
(0.60)  (1.14) 
T1972  -0.0670'  -0.0743' 
(-3.48)  (-4.24) 
DFAIR  0.0266  0.0605 
(0.05)  (0.13) 
Adjusted R2  0.9322  0.9004 
Supply Relation 
Q (x106)  2.3696"  2.3673' 
(12.51)  (12.50) 
A *D55  0.0004'  0.0004' 
(2.29)  (2.30) 
A*D71  0.0005'  0.0005' 
(7.62)  (7.63) 
Adjusted R2  0.8287  0.8287 
N  40  40 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-ratios (two-tailed test). 
a = significant at .01 level of confidence 
b = significant at .05 level of confidence 
c = significant at .10 level of confidence 17 
individually insignificant. However, the demand parameters for advertising  before and 
after the Broadcast Advertising Ban are positive and jointly significant.18 Given a number 
of pairwise correlation coefficients among exogenous variables in excess of .80 and a high 
adjusted R2, the individual lack of significance is likely due to multicollinearity. 
Supply relation parameter estimates are positive and significant at better than one 
percent. These results indicate that market power is present in the cigarette industry, and 
that advertising enhances market power. An interesting result is that X2 is significantly 
greater than Xi at conventional levels of confidence. This suggests that advertising is better 
able to enhance market power after the Broadcast Advertising Ban.  The Broadcast 
Advertising Ban limited the national advertising possibilities for cigarettes, and hence may 
have increased the barrier to entry of new products.19 
Interpretation of this positive price-advertising effect may be due to the fact that 
advertising signals a higher level of quality. Becker and Murphy (1993, p.956) point out 
that "advertised goods may have good qualities that are not observed by econometricians, 
as implied by the signaling literature." In general, however, advertising does not appear to 
signal high quality [Caves and Greene (1996)], and it appears to be particularly unlikely 
for cigarettes.  Indeed, Becker and Murphy (p. 944) "do not believe that the intensive 
advertising for Miller beer, Chevrolet cars, or Marlboro cigarettes, to take a few examples, 
is  signaling exceptionally high product quality." Cigarette producers use a similar 
technology and inputs, hence cigarettes are generally of the same quality level regardless 
of brand. The industry data utilized in this study do not imply that advertised cigarettes are 
18 Reject H0: 133 = (34= 0 at the .05 level of significance. (F-statistic: F(1,30) = 4.17. F-values for 2SLS and
 
3SLS respectively: 7.2567, 4.4865 > 4.17 therefore reject Ho.)
 
19 This is supported b}° Eckard (1991).
 18 
higher-priced than cigarettes that are not advertised, rather they imply that a higher 
aggregate level of advertising leads to market power and higher aggregate prices. 
Estimates of X-2 indicate that a one percent increase in the 1994 level of cigarette 
advertising will result in a price effect (Q(dp/dA)dA) of -$57 million (in 1982 dollars)." 
Substituting the price effect into equation (7), a one percent increase in cigarette 
advertising above its 1994 level will precipitate the following conservative estimate of a 
reduction in social welfare (in 1982 dollars): 
dS = $18.3 million + $24.4 million - $57 million 
= -$14.3 million. 
Thus, even if one ignores externalities altogether, cigarette advertising is clearly excessive 
from society's point of view. 
20 Q = 467,000,000,000 cigarettes, dp/dA = 0.0005 cents per cigarette per millions of 1982 dollars ceteris 
paribus, and d4 = $24,400,000 (in 1982 dollars). 19 
5. CONCLUSION
 
Becker and Murphy have recently developed a theoretical model of advertising and 
welfare that may be empirically estimated. Following Becker and Murphy, this analysis 
incorporates previously unaccounted social benefits of cigarette advertising including the 
utility from advertising when analyzing social welfare effects. An application of the NEIO 
technique within the Becker-Murphy framework provides an estimate of the welfare effect 
of advertising in the domestic cigarette industry. 
Advertising may benefit consumers by providing useful information and subsidizing 
consumer goods. However, results show that an increase in advertising decreases social 
welfare as these benefits are outweighed by the large positive effect of cigarette 
advertising on the price of cigarettes. Therefore cigarette advertising is excessive in spite 
of the television and radio broadcast advertising ban.  Hence society may benefit 
substantially from limiting cigarette advertising below its current equilibrium level . 20 
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